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Abstract—Service aggregation is becoming a cost-effective and
time-efficient way for a business to develop new applications
and services. While it creates tremendous opportunities in
various industry sectors, its cross-organization nature raises
serious challenges in the security domains for authentication.
In this paper we formulate a formal definition of authentication
in service aggregation and a security model for it, and propose
two authentication protocols. One is a one-way protocol and
another is an interactive one. In particular, the constructed
authentication tokens are anonymous to verifiers. We prove
their security, show how to choose optimal system parameters,
and analyse the efficiency.
Keywords-service aggregation; authentication; token.
I. INTRODUCTION
Instead of selling its own services only, an organization
is increasingly aggregating various services offered by other
service providers in different domains with some of its
own services to form more complex and powerful services
to serve consumers. As a cost-effective and time-efficient
way to develop new applications and services, service ag-
gregation can be seen as the process of combining a set
of typically similar or complementing services to achieve
a common goal [11]. It supports on-the-fly discovery, ag-
gregation, deployment and provision of services, and real-
izes the on-demand interaction among consumers, service
aggregators and service providers. Therefore, it empowers
service providers and consumers, and creates tremendous
opportunities in various industry sectors. On the other hand,
elementary services involved in service aggregation are
distributed in different organizations all over the world.
They are exposed to external attacks from the Internet, not
to speak about internal attacks against internal services.
Even though the security assurance of each elementary
service, which is located in an independent security domain,
is given, new security challenges still arise. For example,
the authentication requirement defined for an organisation
cannot be applied to another organisation. It is obvious that
for a password-based authentication system, a user password
cannot be applied to a different organisation. Similarly, a
credential for a consumer might not be applicable to multiple
organisations.
As a critical security issue, authentication is always one of
the main concerns of organizations. Formally, authentication
is the process of determining whether someone or something
is, in fact, who or what it is declared to be. Without
authentication, any user can access the services. In some
extreme situations, an individual could pose as a willing
user, accept the services, and then repudiate the transaction.
In the past few years, there have been rapid development
in the field of authentication, and a lot of authentication
protocols were proposed [1], [7], [10], [12], [13], [16], [18].
According to implementation technologies, authentication
protocols are categorized into different types, such as one-
way protocols in which all communication is one way, and
interactive protocols that work for both pairwise interaction
and group formation. There have been several survey pa-
pers on authentication [14], [15], which gave comparative
analyses. We observe that there is no existing authentication
protocol in the literature that could be applied in service
aggregation efficiently, and this point is discussed in Section
VII. Motivated by it, in this paper, we present a formal
definition of authentication in service aggregation and a
security model for it, and propose a one-way authentication
protocol, which is from Bloom filter. Then we improve it to
generate an interactive authentication protocol by applying
ElGamal cryptosystem. We prove their security, and give a
way to optimize the system parameters. To our knowledge,
this is the first work on authentication in service aggregation,
and there is no existing protocol to compare. So we analyse
their efficiency by comparing with possible solutions and
show that the proposed protocols are the most efficient.
In particular, the proposed protocols use the binary check
to test if an authentication token is valid, which speeds
up verification. Additionally, the constructed authentication
tokens have a property of anonymity, i.e., every service
provider can verify the validity of the authentication token,
but no one can know whom the token belongs to.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Sec-
tion II describes the architecture of service aggregation and
the requirement of authentication. In Section III the models
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of authentication and security are demonstrated. Section IV
and Section V present a one-way and an interactive au-
thentication protocols, respectively, and show their security.
Section VI gives a way to choose optimal system parameters.
In Section VII the efficiency is discussed. Finally, Section
VIII concludes this paper and outlines our future work.
II. SERVICE AGGREGATION
There are three parties in service aggregation, users,
service providers and a service aggregator. They collaborate
in highly distributed environments and establish on-demand,
short-term and dynamic business relationships for purposes
such as maximizing profitability [17]. In order to understand
the requirement of authentication in service aggregation, we
first explain some terms as follows.
User :
it is a fancy name for an application trying to
access services, which are offered by service
providers and the service aggregator. It can be
a website, a desktop program, a mobile device,
or anything else connected to the Internet.
Service Provider :.
it provides various public and professional ser-
vices ranging from simple information retrieval
services to more complex transaction oriented
services. It is the term used to describe the web-
site or web service where professional services
are located. It can be an airline corporation,
a picture shop, an online bank, an express
delivery company, or any others where users
could get their desired services.
Service Aggregator :.
it works as an agency to combine various
services offered by service providers along with
some of its own services and resell the aggre-
gated services to users. It could be a travel
agency, an e-Health service center, etc.
Authentication Token :.
it is used instead of user’s credential to access
services offered by service providers. A Token
is generally a random string of letters and
numbers (but not limited to) that is unique, hard
to guess, and verifiable. Sometime it is paired
with a secret to protect the token from being
abused.
A general diagram that illustrates a simple architecture of
Service Aggregation in a high level is shown in Figure 1.
In order to provide aggregated services to users, service
providers register with the service aggregator and supply the
links of their services to the service aggregator. Similarly,
in order to access aggregated services, every user needs to
register with the service aggregator and becomes its member.
Usually different members of the service aggregator have
different rights to access different services that the service
Figure 1. Architecture of Service Aggregation
aggregator provides. For example, golden members could
access more services than normal members. Notice that users
do not need to register themselves with service providers.
When a user would like to access some services, she sends
a service request to the service aggregator. The service
aggregator searches for all services associated with the
request and displays public services that are free to the user
and protected services that need the user to sign on. To
obtain the protected services, the user has to authenticate
her to the service aggregator. If the protected services come
from some external service providers (i.e., the services
are external), even though the user is not a member of
these service providers, she, as a member of the service
aggregator, can still access these external services. However,
the user has to authenticate her to these service providers. To
do so, the service aggregator will construct an authentication
token for the user. The user shows the authentication token
to these service providers, who can verify the validity of the
authentication token. Because the user is just a member of
the service aggregator, considering her privacy, she does not
want other parties, including the service providers, to know
her identity. This means, the authentication token must allow
the user to remain anonymous to the verifiers. If the token
is correct, the service providers give permission to the user
for accessing the external services.
III. MODELS
Throughout this paper, we use the following notation.
Let a R←− A denote choosing an element a uniformly at
random from the set A. The set of natural numbers is de-
noted by N. For an integer n, [n] denotes the set of integers
{1, 2, . . . , n}. We write x||y to denote the concatenation of
the bit-strings x, y. By default, let e be the base of the natural
logarithm, lg k
def
= log2 k, and ln k
def
= loge k for a number
k.
A. Authentication in Service Aggregation
We give a formal definition of Authentication in Service
Aggregation (AuthSA) as follows.
322
Definition III.1 An AuthSA protocol consists of two par-
ties as follows.
Setup : The service aggregator chooses a security
parameter s and generates a system parameter
PARA that includes a public key PUK and
a private key PRK. Every user and service
provider register with the service aggregator
by supplying their identities IDu and IDsp
and corresponding credentials Cu and Csp,
respectively.
Sign-On : A user logs on the service aggregator to ob-
tain an authentication token and then uses the
authentication token to access her accessible
service providers. It consists of the following
three algorithms.
Logon(IDu, Cu) :.
The algorithm takes as input user’s
identity IDu and credential Cu, and
outputs 1 if the user is legitimate, or
0 otherwise.
BuildAuthToken(PARA, IDu, Cu, {IDspi ,.
Cspi}i=1,··· ,m) :
The algorithm takes as input the
system parameter PARA, user’s
identity IDu and credential Cu,
and service providers’ identities
{IDspi}i=1,··· ,m and credentials
{Cspi}i=1,··· ,m (m ∈ N), and
outputs an authentication token AT
for the user identified by IDu.
Verify(PUK,AT, IDspi , Cspi ) :.
The algorithm takes as its input the
public key PUK, an authentication
token AT , a service provider’s iden-
tity IDspi and corresponding cre-
dential Cspi , and outputs 1 if the
user are authenticated to access the
services of the service provider iden-
tified by IDspi , or 0 otherwise.
B. Security Model
Now we introduce a security model called Semantic
Security against Adaptive Chosen Identity Attack (IND-
CIA). Intuitively, it aims to capture the notion that an
adversary A cannot deduce a user’s identity from her au-
thentication tokens. Roughly speaking, the game works as
follows. Suppose the challenger C gives the adversary A two
identities ID0 and ID1, together with an access token. Here,
A’s challenge is to determine which identity is the owner of
the access token. If the problem of distinguishing between
the access token for ID0 and ID1 is hard, then deducing the
identity from the access token must also be hard. If A cannot
determine which identity is the owner of the access token
with probability non-negligibly different from 1/2, then the
access token reveals nothing about the identity. We use this
formulation of access token indistinguishability to prove the
semantic security of access tokens
In particular, an adversary could be a user, a coalition of
users, a service provider, a coalition of service providers,
or a coalition of users and service providers. We use the
following game between a challenger C and an attacker A
to define IND-CIA from a coalition of users and service
providers.
Definition III.2 IND-CIA is a security game between an
adversary A and a challenger C as follows. To describe
conveniently, we omit the parts concerning passwords.
Setup : A adaptively selects a set of user identities
{IDui}i=1,··· ,n (n ∈ N) and a set of service
provider identities {IDspj}j=1,··· ,m (m ∈ N).
Query : A may query C for the authentication
token AT for a user identified by IDu′
(u′ ∈ {ui}i=1,··· ,n) and a subset of service
providers identified by {IDspji }i=1,··· ,m′ (i.e.,
{IDspji}i=1,··· ,m′ ⊆ {IDspj}j=1,··· ,m). On
receiving the identities of the user and the ser-
vice providers, C runs the algorithm BuildAu-
thToken to generate the authentication token
to A, who can invoke the algorithm Verify to
check if the user IDu′ is permitted to access
the services of the set of service providers
{IDspji}i=1,··· ,m′ .
Challenge : After making a polynomial number of
queries, A decides on challenge by picking
two users identified by IDu′0 and IDu′1 and
a subset of service providers identified by
{IDspji}i=1,··· ,m′′ ({ji}i=1,··· ,m′′ ⊆ [m]) and
sending them to C. Then C chooses b R←−
{0, 1}, runs the algorithm BuildAuthToken
with the identity IDu′b and the set of service
providers’ identities {IDspji}i=1,··· ,m′′ to gen-
erate the authentication token ATb, and returns
it to A. After the challenge of determining b
for A is issued, A is allowed again to query C
another polynomial number times.
Response : Finally A outputs a bit bA, and is successful
if bA = b. The advantage of A in winning this
game is defined as AdvA = |Pr[b = bA] −
1/2|, and the adversary is said to have an ε-
advantage if AdvA ≥ ε.
IV. ONE-WAY AUTHSA PROTOCOL
In the literature, there are many protocols for making a
secure authentication between two parties – a user and a
service aggregator. This is not the main concern of this paper.
We just use the simplest method – identity and password –
to make such an authentication. Our concentration is on the
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construction of the authentication token. In this section, we
use Bloom filter to construct a one-way AuthSA protocol
and prove its security according to the game IND-CIA.
A. Background
A Bloom Filter [3] can efficiently store information about
the existence of a record in a database. Although it yields
false positives, the probability of a false positive can be made
as small as requested.
A Bloom filter represents a set of Y = {y1, y2, . . . , yt}
of t elements by an array BF of m bits. All array bits are
initially set to 0. The filter uses s independent hash functions
H1, . . . ,Hs, where Hj : {0, 1}∗ → [m] for j ∈ [s], i.e., it
requires a set of s independent hash functions that produce
uniformly distributed output in [m] over all possible inputs.
For each element yj (j = 1, . . . , t), the array bits at positions
H1(yj), . . . ,Hs(yj) are set to 1. A location can be set to 1
multiple times, but only the first is noted.
To add an entry y to the filter, compute p1 = H1(y), p2 =
H2(y), . . . , ps = Hs(y), and set BF [pj ] = 1 for j =
1, . . . , s.
To check whether or not a value y is in the database,
the same positions pj are calculated and bits BF [pj ] are
examined. If all the checked bits are 1, the record y is
considered a member of the set. There is, however, some
probability of a false positive, in which y appears to be in
Y but actually is not. False positives occur because each
location may have also been set by some element other than
y. On the other hand, if any checked bits are 0, then y is
definitely not a member of Y .
B. Construction
Setup :
1) The service aggregator chooses a secu-
rity parameter s, ki
R←− {0, 1}s, i =
0, 1, · · · , r, r ∈ N, and a pseudo-random
function H : {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}s −→
{0, 1}s as the system parameter PARA =
{s, k0, · · · , kr, H}. Then the service ag-
gregator publishes the system public keys
PUK = {H, k1, · · · , kr} and keeps the
private key PRK = {k0}.
2) A user u registers with the service aggrega-
tor by supplying her identity and password
(as credential) (IDu, PWu).
3) A service provider sp registers with
the service aggregator by supplying its




User u logs on the service aggre-
gator with her identity and password
(IDu, PWu), and the service aggregator
verifies the user’s identity and password
with the data in its credential database.
If the identity and password are correct,
it outputs 1; Otherwise, 0.
BuildAuthToken(PARA, IDu, Cu, {IDspi ,.
Cspi}i=1,··· ,m) :
For a legitimate user (i.e., the output of
the algorithm Logon(IDu, Cu) is 1), the
service aggregator runs this algorithm as
follows.
1) Finds all service providers spj (j =
1, · · · , n) accessible for the user u,
where n ∈ N.
2) Creates a timestamp ts.
3) Computes
M = H(ts||IDu||PWu, k0).
4) Computes
pi,0 = H(M ||ki, k0) for i ∈ [r].
5) Computes
pi,j = H(ts||M ||IDspj ||PWspj , ki)
for i ∈ [r] and j ∈ [n].
6) Generates a Bloom filter BF by
setting BF [pi,j ] = 1 (i = 1, · · · , r
and j = 0, 1, . . . , n).
7) Outputs an authentication token
AT = {ts,M,BF} for the user u.
Verify(PUK,AT, IDspi , Cspi ) :.
In order to access services provided by a
service provider spi (i ∈ [m]), the user
shows the authentication token AT =
{ts,M,BF} to the service provider,
who runs this algorithm as follows.
1) Computes
pi = H(ts||M ||IDsp||PWsp, ki)
for i ∈ [r].
2) Tests if BF contains 1’s in all r
locations denoted by p1, · · · , pr.
3) If yes, outputs 1; Otherwise, 0.
C. Security
Theorem 1 The proposed one-way AuthSA protocol is se-
mantically secure under the security game IND-CIA.
Proof: Suppose the proposed protocol is not seman-
tically secure against chosen keyword-attacks, i.e., there
exists an adversary A who has an ε-advantage to win the
IND-CIA game, even though A does not have the value of
the private key k0. Then we build an algorithm A′ that uses
A as a subroutine to determine with an ε-advantage if H is a
pseudo-random function or a random function. Let A′ query
an oracle OH for the unknown function H : {0, 1}∗ →
{0, 1}s. When running the algorithm BuildAuthToken, A′
substitutes evaluations of H with queries to the oracle OH .
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For example, when A′ needs to compute the value of M ,
H(ts||IDu||PWu, k0), it queries OH for the value with
input ts||IDu||PWu||k0. A′ uses A in IND-CIA game as
follows:
Setup : A adaptively selects a set of user identities
{IDui}i=1,··· ,n (n ∈ N) and a set of service
provider identities {IDspj}j=1,··· ,m (m ∈ N).
Query : A may query A′ for the authentication
token AT for a user identified by IDu′
(u′ ∈ {ui}i=1,··· ,n) and a subset of service
providers identified by {IDspji}i=1,··· ,m′ (i.e.,
{IDspji}i=1,··· ,m′ ⊆ {IDspj}j=1,··· ,m). On
receiving the identities of the user and the ser-
vice providers, A′ runs the algorithm BuildAu-
thToken to generate the authentication token
and sends it to A.
Challenge : After making a polynomial number of
queries, A decides on challenge by picking
two users identified by IDu′0 and IDu′1 and
a subset of service providers identified by
{IDspji}i=1,··· ,m′′ ({ji}i=1,··· ,m′′ ⊆ [m]) and
sending them to A′. Then A′ chooses b R←−
{0, 1}, runs the algorithm BuildAuthToken
with the identity IDu′b and the set of service
providers’ identities {IDspji }i=1,··· ,m′′ to gen-
erate the authentication token ATb, and returns
it to A. After the challenge of determining b
for A is issued, A is allowed again to query A′
another polynomial number times.
Response : Finally A outputs a bit bA, which represents
its guess for b. If bA = b, then A′ outputs 1,
indicating that it guesses that H is a pseudo-
random function. Otherwise, A′ outputs 0.
When H is a pseudo-random function. Because A has an
ε-advantage to win the IND-CIA game, and A′ simulates
the challenger C perfectly in the IND-CIA game. We have
|Pr[A′H(·,k) = 1|k
R←− {0, 1}s]− 1
2
| ≥ ε. (1)
When H is a random function. The hash value is treated as
a random value, it follows that the values of M , pi,0 and pi,j
(i ∈ [r], j ∈ [n]) can be viewed as random values. Because
the timestamp ts is never repeated, for any two queries, no
matter whether the user identities are different or identical,
the values of M that A′ queries OH twice with the input
ts||IDu||PWu||k0, as two random values, are independent
to each other. In the same way, the values of pi,0 and pi,j
(i ∈ [r], j ∈ [n]) are also independent to each other. This
means, the authentication token reveals nothing about the
user identity. Therefore, for the challenge, it is infeasible
for A to correlate the authentication token with the user
identity. Based on the above analysis, A at best guesses b
correctly with probability 1/2. Thus we have
Pr[A′H = 1|H
R←− {H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}s}] = 1/2. (2)




R←− {H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}s}]| ≥ ε.
Therefore, we have proven the desired conclusion.
V. INTERACTIVE AUTHSA PROTOCOL
For the above protocol, if an adversary could capture an
authentication token that a user is using to access a service
provider, then he can use it to gain unauthorized access to
other service providers that are accessible for the user in the
meantime. To overcome this vulnerability, we improve the
protocol to construct an interactive authentication protocol
by applying ElGamal cryptosystem.
A. ElGamal Cryptosystem
ElGamal cryptosystem consists of the following three
algorithms: the key generation, the encryption, and the
decryption. For the details, refer to [8].
Key Generation :.
The algorithm works as follows:
1) Generates a multiplicative cyclic group G
with the order of a large prime p and the
generator g.
2) Selects x R←− Zp and compute y = gx.
3) Publishes {p, g, y} as the public key, and
retains x as the private key.
Encryption :.
The algorithm works as follows: to encrypt a
message m with the public key,
1) Chooses t R←− Zp.
2) Computes c1 = gt and c2 = myt.
3) Outputs the ciphertext c = {c1, c2}.
Decryption :.
The algorithm works as follows: to decrypt a
ciphertext c = {c1, c2} with the private key.
1) Computes h = cx1 .





1) Service aggregator chooses a security pa-
rameter s, creates a multiplicative cyclic
group G with the order of a large
prime p and the generator g, and selects
ki
R←− {0, 1}s, i = 0, 1, · · · , r, r ∈
N, and a pseudo-random function H :
{0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}s −→ {0, 1}s. Then the
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service aggregator sets the system parame-
ter PARA = {s, k0, · · · , kr, H, g, p}, pub-
lishes the system public keys PUK =
{k1, · · · , kr, H, g, p}, and keeps the private
key PRK = {k0}.
2) A user u chooses x R←− Zp and com-
putes y = gx. She takes Prku = {x}
and Pubu = {y} as her private key and
public key, respectively. Then she registers
with the service aggregator by supplying
her identity and password (as credential)
(IDu, PWu).




This algorithm is the same as in the
above one-way AuthSA protocol.
BuildAuthToken(PARA, IDu, Cu, Puku,.
{IDspi , Cspi}i=1,··· ,m) :
For a legitimate user (i.e., the output
of the algorithm Logon(IDu, Cu) is
1), the service aggregator runs this
algorithm as follows.
1) The first 6 steps are the same as in
the above one-way AuthSA proto-
col.
2) Chooses t R←− Zp, computes c1 =
gt and c2 = Myt, and sets M ′ =
{c1, c2}.
3) Outputs an authentication token
AT = {ts,M ′, BF} for the user
u.
Verify(PUK,AT, Prku, IDspi , Cspi ) :.
In order to access services provided by
a service provider spi (i ∈ [m]), the
user u shows the authentication token
AT = {ts,M ′, BF} to the service
provider spi, who interacts with the
user u as follows.
1) spi chooses v
R←− Zp, computes
c′2 = c2g
v , and gives c′2 to u.




3) spi computes M = c̃2g−v .
4) The next 3 steps are the same
as in the above one-way AuthSA
protocol.
As stated in [2], ElGamal cryptosystem has a property of
anonymity. This means that no body can guess the identity
of the user from the public key and the ciphertext. Based
on Theorem 1, we have the following theorem. The detailed
proof is omitted.
Theorem 2 The proposed interactive AuthSA protocol is
semantically secure under the security game IND-CIA.
VI. OPTIMIZING PARAMETERS
The proposed protocol uses the Bloom filter to build
authentication token for users to access external services
anonymously, so it induces false positives inevitably. Now
we compute the probability of a false positive occurring in
a Bloom filter. Let’s assume that the size of the Bloom filter
is m bits, the number of hash keys is r, the maximum of
service providers accessible for a user is n, and the hash
function H behaves as a random oracle. The probability of
a false positive is
Pr = (1− (1− 1m )
rn)r
≈ (1− e− rnm )r
This means that three parameters r, n and m affect
the probability of a false positive in different (positive or
negative) ways. In order to minimize probability of a false
positive, we compute the derivative of Pr with respect to r,
dPr
dr , and let it equal to 0 to obtain the optimal parameter
r = m ln 2n .
Then, the minimum probability of a false positive is
Pr = 2−r.
Therefore, we can control the probability of false positive
by adjusting the related parameter r, i.e., adjusting the ratio
of m to n. On the other hand, we point out that the false
negatives never happen.
Now we describe the procedure showing how to select the
suitable parameters as follows.
Step 1 Choose the desired probability of a false pos-
itives rate Pr and compute the number of
pseudo-random function keys required,
r = d− lgPre .
Step 2 Estimate the upper bound of the number of
service providers accessible for a user, n, which
should satisfy the future update.
Step 3 Once the parameters r and n are determined,








First we describe other two possible methods of construct-
ing AuthSA protocols. Let’s recall the mechanism of classic
(non-interactive) signature-based authentication protocols.
Usually a message M of Sender A is accompanied by the
signature SighprkA(M). Receiver B can know that M really
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is from A by confirming that the signature is signed on the
message M by A with her private key prkA.
We can apply any classic (non-interactive) signature-
based authentication protocol to construct an AuthSA pro-
tocol by simply replacing the Bloom filter BF in the
proposed one-way AuthSA protocol with the signature
set {Sighprksp1 (M), · · · , Sighprkspn (M)}. When a service
provider SPj (j ∈ [n]) receives the authentication token, she
can decide to or not to authenticate the user by verifying
whether the j-th signature Sighprkspj (M) is generated with
her private key prkspj . We call such a straightway appli-
cation of signature-based authentication protocol a naive
AuthSA protocol.
Another way to construct an AuthSA protocol might be
based on multi-user signature schemes, such as group, ring,
and aggregate signatures. We just give a general idea to the
construction as follows. Let MSign(prksp1 ,··· ,prksp1 )(M)
denote a signature on the message M with the private
keys of the service providers {sp1, · · · , sp1}. The Bloom
filter BF in the proposed one-way AuthSA protocol is
replaced with the signature MSign(prksp1 ,··· ,prksp1 )(M).
When a service provider receives the authentication token,
she authenticates the user if she confirms that the signature
MSign(prksp1 ,··· ,prksp1 )(M) is signed on the message M
with her private key prkspj . We did not try to modify
any multi-user signature scheme to construct an AuthSA
protocol, but we believe it should be possible. We call such
a scheme a MS AuthSA protocol.
Now we consider an example of the proposed one-way
AuthSA protocol to compute the size of the Bloom filter.
Assume that the probability of a false positive is a millionth
(10−6), and the maximum number of service providers
accessible to a user is 20. We use the method in Section VI to
compute the size of Bloom filter m = 578(bits). To evaluate
the sizes of signatures in naive and MS AuthSA protocols,
we use the data in [9] about the short signature sizes in BLS
(Boneh, Lynn, and Shacham’s) regular signature scheme
[5], BBS (Boneh, Boyen, and Shacham’s) group signature
scheme [4], and CYH (Chow, Yiu, and Hui’s) ring signature
scheme [6]. Then the comparison is as follows.
Table 1. Comparison of the Token
Scheme Naive MS MS Ours
(BLS) (BBS) (CYH)
Size 3200 bits 2400 bits 3360 bits 578 bits
Note that the size is just of the third part of the authentication
(i.e., the Bloom filter or signature), not of the whole token.
From the above table, we know that our schemes are the
best on the size of the authentication token. As stated in [9],
the size of ring signature grows linearly with the number of
service providers. For the computation complexity, different
algorithms and hash functions have different computation
expenses. Therefore, without the detailed constructions, we
cannot give the detailed evaluation on them. However, all
short signature schemes require expensive pairing opera-
tions. According to the experiment of http://www.shamus.ie,
the calculation of one pairing takes at least 4 times or more
than that of RSA. Instead, the proposed protocols use the
binary check to test if an authentication token is valid, which
speeds up service providers’ verification more efficiently.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND OPEN PROBLEM
In this paper, we described the requirement of authen-
tication in service aggregation, and formulated a formal
definition and a security game for it. Based on Bloom
filter and ElGamal cryptosystem, we proposed a one-way
authentication protocol and improved it to get an interactive
one. Their security was proven. We also discussed how to
choose the optimal system parameters, and gave efficiency
analysis showing that the proposed protocols are the most
efficient.
We are working on security issues in service aggregation
in the cloud environment. How to authenticate a user for
such a situation is an open problem.
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